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Abstract
We present the first analysis of Fisher markets with buyers that have budget-additive utility
functions. Budget-additive utilities are elementary concave functions with numerous applications
in online adword markets and revenue optimization problems. They extend the standard case
of linear utilities and have been studied in a variety of other market models. In contrast to
the frequently studied CES utilities, they have a global satiation point which can imply multiple
market equilibria with quite different characteristics. Our main result is an efficient combinatorial
algorithm to compute a market equilibrium with a Pareto-optimal allocation of goods. It relies
on a new descending-price approach and, as a special case, also implies a novel combinatorial
algorithm for computing a market equilibrium in linear Fisher markets. We complement this
positive result with a number of hardness results for related computational questions. We prove
that it is NP-hard to compute a market equilibrium that maximizes social welfare, and it is
PPAD-hard to find any market equilibrium with utility functions with separate satiation points
for each buyer and each good.
1998 ACM Subject Classification F.2.2 Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems
Keywords and phrases Budget-Additive Utility, Market Equilibrium, Equilibrium Computation
Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs.xxx.yyy.p
1 Introduction
The concept of market equilibrium is a fundamental and well-established notion in economics
to analyze and predict the outcomes of strategic interaction in large markets. Initiated by
Walras in 1874, the study of market equilibrium has become a cornerstone of microeconomic
analysis, mostly due to general results that established existence under very mild conditions [2].
Since efficient computation is a fundamental criterion to evaluate the plausibility of equilibrium
concepts, the algorithmic aspects of market equilibrium are one of the central domains
in algorithmic game theory. Over the last decade, several new algorithmic approaches to
compute market equilibria were discovered. Efficient algorithms based on convex programming
techniques can compute equilibria in a large variety of domains [12,22,25]. More importantly,
several approaches were proposed that avoid the use of heavy algorithmic machinery and
follow combinatorial strategies [17,19,20,26,29,32], or even work as a tâtonnement process in
unknown market environments [4, 10,13]. Designing such combinatorial algorithms is useful
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2 Computing Equilibria in Markets with Budget-Additive Utilities
also beyond the study of markets, since the underlying ideas can be applied in other areas.
Variants of these algorithms were shown to solve scheduling [23, 24] and cloud computing
problems [15], or can be used for fair allocation of indivisible items [14].
In this paper, we design a new combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for computing
equilibria in Fisher markets with budget-additive utilities. In a Fisher market, there is a
single seller with a set G = {1, . . . ,m} of goods. W.l.o.g. we assume that the total quantity
of each good is 1. There is a set B = {1, . . . , n} of buyers. Each buyer i has a budget Mi > 0
of money and a utility function ui. For budget-additive utilities, uij ≥ 0 is the utility of
buyer i if one unit of good j is allocated to her. There is a happiness cap ci > 0, and the
utility function is
ui(xi) = min
ci,∑
j∈G
uijxij
 ,
where xi = (xij)j∈G is any bundle of goods assigned to buyer i. If ui(xi) = ci, then buyer i
is called capped buyer for allocation x. We assume all uij , ci, Mi are rational numbers.
Our goal is to compute an allocation x = (xi)i∈B of goods and prices p = (pj)j∈G
such that the pair (x,p) is a market equilibrium. Given prices p, a demand bundle x∗i
of buyer i is a bundle of goods that maximizes the utility of buyer i for its budget, i.e.,
x∗i ∈ arg max
{
ui(xi) |
∑
j pjxij ≤Mi
}
. Note that
∑
j uijx
∗
ij > ci is allowed. A market
equilibrium (x,p) is a pair such that
p ≥ 0 (prices are nonnegative),∑
i xij ≤ 1 for every j ∈ G (no overallocation),
xi is a demand bundle for every i ∈ B, and
Walras’ law holds: pj(1−
∑
i xij) = 0 for every j ∈ G.
Note that if
∑
i xij < 1, then pj = 0. An equilibrium (x,p) is Pareto-optimal if there is
no equilibrium (x′,p′) such that ui(x) ≤ ui(x′) for all i and ui(x) < ui(x′) for at least one i.
Budget-additive utility functions are a simple class of submodular and concave functions
and a natural generalization of the standard and well-understood case of linear utilities.
These utility functions arise naturally in cases where agents have an intrinsic upper bound
on their utility. For example, if the goods are food and the utility of a food item for a
particular buyer is its calorie content, calories above a certain threshold do not increase
the utility of the buyer. In addition, there are a variety of further applications in adword
auctions and revenue maximization problems [1, 3, 6, 8]. Recently, market models where
agents have budget-additive utilities attracted a significant amount of research interest,
e.g., for the allocation of indivisible goods in offline [1, 3, 8] and online [6, 27] scenarios, for
truthful mechanism design [7], and for the study of Walrasian equilibrium with quasi-linear
utilities [18,21,30]. As simple variants of submodular functions, they capture many of the
inherent difficulties of more general domains. Given this amount of interest, it is perhaps
surprising that they are not well-understood within the classic Fisher and exchange markets.
Results and Contribution. We study Fisher markets with budget-additive utilities.
Our initial observations about these markets reveal that they have different properties than
the ones with CES utilities usually studied in the literature. Due to the satiated nature
of the utilities, capped buyers might not spend all their money or spend money on goods
that do not give them maximum utility per unit of money, so prices and utilities in market
equilibrium are not unique and can be quite different. It is possible to simply ignore the
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satiation and assume linear utilities. Then a variety of existing algorithms [4,17,19,20,29]
can be used to compute a market equilibrium. It continues to be a market equilibrium for
the market with budget-additive utilities. However, this equilibrium may be undesirable, as
in many cases it does not even satisfy Pareto-optimality of the allocation.
I Example 1. Consider a linear market with two buyers and two goods, u11 = 5, u21 = 2,
and u12 = u22 = 1. The budgets are M1 = 3 and M2 = 1. For the unique equilibrium we
allocate good 1 completely to buyer 1 and good 2 completely to buyer 2, i.e., x11 = x22 = 1.
The buyers’ utilities amount to 5 and 1, resp., and the prices are p1 = 3 and p2 = 1.
Now suppose buyer 1 has a budget-additive utility function with cap c1 = 1. Then (x,p)
described above remains an equilibrium, since both buyers obtain a demand bundle (buyer
1 now has utility 1 instead of 5). Alternatively, suppose we allocate good 1 completely to
buyer 2 and good 2 completely to buyer 1, i.e., x12 = x21 = 1. The utilities amount to 1 and
2, resp., and the prices can be chosen as p1 = 1 and p2 ∈ [0.5, 3]. Here buyer 1 buys a bundle
of goods with optimal utility of 1. Buyer 2 buys a demand bundle since he spends all its
budget on a good that gives him the maximum bang-per-buck ratio. All goods are exactly
allocated, and Walras’ law holds. Thus, it represents another market equilibrium. Note if
p2 < 3, buyer 1 does not spend all of its money, but it is still a demand bundle for because
he achieves the maximum utility. Furthermore, such an equilibrium Pareto-dominates the
one derived from the linear case in terms of utilities. 
We strive to compute a market equilibrium with a Pareto-optimal allocation and focus on
a subset of market equilibria, in which we restrict the allocation to demand bundles which
we call thrifty and modest – buyers spend the least amount of money that can achieve their
optimal utilities and receive a bundle of goods that has a minimality property. In Section 2,
we show that such modest MBB equilibria can be captured by a generalization of classic
Eisenberg-Gale convex program, and with this additional property the utilities are unique
and the allocation is always Pareto-optimal (w.r.t. all possible allocations, attainable in
market equilibrium or not). We highlight that the set of modest MBB equilibria can be
partially ordered with respect to their price vectors and forms a lattice. As such, there are
modest MBB equilibria with pointwise largest and smallest prices, resp. Among all modest
MBB equilibria they yield maximum and minimum revenue for the seller, resp.
Section 3 contains our main contribution – a combinatorial algorithm that computes
price and allocation vectors of a modest MBB equilibrium in time O(mn6(log(m+ n) + (m+
n) logU)), where n is the number of agents, m the number of goods, and U the largest integer
in the market parameters. The computed equilibrium has a Pareto-optimal allocation, as
well as pointwise largest prices and maximum revenue among all modest MBB equilibria.
Our algorithm represents a novel approach to compute market equilibria based on the
idea of descending prices. While some parts of our algorithm are in spirit of combinatorial
algorithms for linear markets [4,17,19,20], all these approaches are ascending-price algorithms.
This technique and its usual analysis based the 1-norm of excess money does not apply in
our case, since the norm is non-monotonic and cannot be used to measure progress towards
equilibrium. Surprisingly, our novel descending-price approach overcomes the 1-norm issue,
but we need to address additional challenges in establishing polynomial running time due to
varying and non-increasing active budgets, and in showing that intermediate prices remain
polynomially bounded. Note that, as a special case, this also yields a new combinatorial
descending-price algorithm for linear Fisher markets.
In Section 4 we exploit the lattice structure of modest MBB equilibria and design a
procedure, using which we can turn any modest MBB equilibrium into one with smallest prices
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and minimum revenue. In combination with the descending-price algorithm, it computes a
modest MBB equilibrium with minimum revenue within the same asymptotic time bound.
Finally, we study two extensions in Section 5. Facing multiple equilibria, a natural goal
is to compute an allocation that maximizes utilitarian social welfare. We prove that this
problem is NP-hard, even when social welfare is measured by a k-norm of the vector of buyer
utilities, for any constant k > 0. Moreover, we consider a variant of the budget-additive
utilities with a satiation point for each buyer and each good. They constitute a special class
of separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utilities, where each piecewise-linear component
consists of two segments with the second one being constant. We show that even in this very
special case computing any market equilibrium becomes PPAD-hard.
Related Work. The computation of market equilibria is a central area in algorithmic
game theory. There are a variety of polynomial-time algorithms to compute approximate
market equilibria based on solving different convex programming formulations [12, 22, 25].
Our paper is closer to work on markets with linear utilities and combinatorial algorithms
that compute an exact equilibrium in polynomial time [17, 19, 20, 29]. Directly related to our
approach is the classic combinatorial algorithm for linear Fisher markets [17]. In contrast,
our algorithm is based on a new descending price approach where buyers are always saturated
and goods have non-negative surplus. Further, the active budgets of buyers vary with the
price change, which creates new challenges in establishing a polynomial bound on the number
of iterations and the representation size of intermediate prices.
Independently of our work, Devanur et al [16] very recently presented the same convex
program for Fisher markets with satiated buyers. They propose a polynomial-time algorithm
for finding an arbitrary modest MBB equilibrium, but it is based on the ellipsoid method
without any explicit running time bound.
Recently, algorithmic work has also started to address unknown markets, where utilities
and budgets of buyers are unknown. Instead, algorithms iteratively set prices and query a
demand oracle. In this domain, tâtonnement dynamics have been studied for Fisher markets
and extensions with concave utilities. For many classes of these markets, a notion of (1 + )-
approximate market equilibrium can be reached after a convergence time polynomial in 1/
and other market parameters [5, 10, 11, 13]. In some cases, the convergence time can even be
reduced to log(1/) [10]. A similar convergence rate is obtained by a more general algorithm
even for general unknown exchange markets with weak gross-substitutes property, and even
for linear markets with non-continuous demands and oracles using suitable tie-breaking [4].
Allocation of indivisible items to agents with budget-additive utilities is an active area
of research interest. There are constant-factor approximation algorithms for optimizing the
allocation in offline [1, 3, 8] and online [6, 27] scenarios. Closer to our work is the study of
markets with money. The existence of Walrasian equilibrium with quasi-linear utilities and
algorithmic issues of bundling items were studied in [18,21,30]. Strategic agents and truthful
mechanisms for budget-additive markets have been analyzed in [7]. There are strong lower
bounds for the approximation ratio of certain classes of truthful mechanisms, and a truthful
mechanism with constant-factor approximation for budget-additive utilities is one of the
most interesting open problems in combinatorial auctions.
2 Preliminaries
For a given price vector p and buyer i, we denote the maximum bang-per-buck (MBB) ratio
by αi = maxj uij/pj , where we make the assumption that 0/0 = 0. Budget-additive utilities
strictly generalize linear utilities: when all ci’s are large enough, they are equivalent to linear
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utilities. If buyer i is uncapped in a market equilibrium (x,p), it behaves as in the linear case,
spends all its budget, and buys only MBB goods (xij > 0 only if uij/pj = αi). Otherwise, if
buyer i is capped in (x,p), it might buy non-MBB goods and not spend all of its budget.
This implies that unlike the case of linear utilities, market equilibrium prices and utilities
are not unique with budget-additive utilities.
It is easy to see that we can obtain one market equilibrium by simply ignoring the
happiness caps and treating the market as a linear one. However, this equilibrium is often
undesirable since it is not always Pareto-optimal.
Our main goal in this paper is to find a market equilibrium that is Pareto-optimal. More
generally, we will also be concerned with finding a (Pareto-optimal) market equilibrium
that can maximize social welfare
∑
i∈B ui(xi). For the former we provide a polynomial-time
algorithm, the latter we prove it to be NP-hard.
Modest MBB Equilibria, Pareto-Optimality, and Uniqueness. The main challenges
in budget-additive markets arise from capped buyers, who may possibly have multiple choices
for the demand bundle. Let us introduce two convenient restrictions on the allocation to
capped buyers.
An allocation xi for buyer i is called modest if
∑
j uijxij ≤ ci. By definition, for uncapped
buyers every demand bundle is modest. For capped buyers, a modest bundle of goods xi
is such that utility breaks even between the linear part and ci, i.e., ci =
∑
j uijxij .
A demand bundle xi is called thrifty or MBB if it consists of only MBB goods: xij > 0
only if uij/pj = αi. As noted above, for uncapped buyers every demand bundle is MBB.
We call a market equilibrium (x,p) a modest MBB equilibrium if xi is modest and MBB
for every buyer i ∈ B. We show an algorithm to compute in polynomial time such an
equilibrium where x is also Pareto-optimal. Such an equilibrium is also desirable because it
agrees the behavioral assumption that each buyer is thrifty and spends the least amount of
money in order to obtain a utility maximizing bundle of goods.
Consider the following Eisenberg-Gale program (1), which allows us to find a modest and
Pareto-optimal allocation.
Max.
∑
i∈B
Mi log
∑
j∈G
uijxij
s.t.
∑
j∈G
uijxij ≤ ci i ∈ B
∑
i∈B
xij ≤ 1 j ∈ G
xij ≥ 0 i ∈ B, j ∈ G
(1)
By standard arguments, we consider the dual for (1) using dual variables γi and pj for the
first two constraints, resp., and the KKT conditions read:
1. pj/uij ≥Mi/ui − γi
2. xij > 0 ⇒ pj/uij = Mi/ui − γi
3. pj ≥ 0 and pj > 0 ⇒
∑
i∈B xij = 1
4. γi ≥ 0 and γi > 0 ⇒ ui = ci
Observe that the Lagrange multiplier γi indicates if the cap ci represents a tight constraint
in the optimum solution. The dual variables pj can be interpreted as prices. Note that
conditions 1 and 2 imply that xij > 0 if and only if j ∈ arg minj′ pj′/uij′ = arg maxj′ uij′/pj′ ,
i.e., all agents purchase goods with maximum bang-per-buck. Hence, similarly as for linear
markets [31], the KKT conditions imply that an optimal solution to the EG program (1)
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and corresponding dual prices constitute a market equilibrium, in which every agent buys
goods that have maximum bang-per-buck. The KKT conditions postulate this also for agents
whose utility reaches the cap. Thus, the optimal solution to this program is a modest MBB
equilibrium. Furthermore, we obtain the following favorable analytical properties.
I Proposition 1. The optimal solutions to (1) are exactly the modest MBB equilibria. The
utility vector is unique across all such equilibria and each such equilibrium is Pareto-optimal.
In particular, there is a unique set of capped buyers. Non-capped buyers spend all their
money. Capped buyers do not overspend.
Proof. We observe first that there is an interior feasible solution to (1). Simply set xij =  > 0
for all i and j, where  is small enough such all constraints in (1) are satisfied with inequality.
The existence of an interior feasible solution guarantees that the KKT conditions are necessary
and sufficient for an optimal solution to (1).
Let x and x′ be two optimal solutions to (1) and assume that uh(x) 6= uh(x′) for some
buyer h. Consider the allocation x′′ = (x + x′)/2. It is clearly feasible. Also,
∑
i∈B
Mi log ui(x′′) <
(∑
i∈B
Mi log ui(x) +
∑
i∈B
Mi log ui(x′)
)
/2 ,
a contradiction to the optimality of the allocation. The inequality follows from the concavity
of the log-function. We have now shown that the utilities of the buyers are unique among
all optimal solutions of (1). Thus, every optimal solution to (1) is modest, MBB and
Pareto-optimal.
Conversely, let (x,p) be a modest MBB equilibrium. We show that x is an optimal
solution to (1). x is feasible since it is modest and does not overallocate any good. Since xi
is a thrifty demand bundle for buyer i, we have uij/pj = αi = max` ui`/p` whenever xij > 0.
Thus
Mi ≥
∑
j
pjxij =
∑
j
uij
αi
xij =
ui(x)
αi
,
and hence Mi/ui(x) ≥ 1/αi. Let γi = Mi/ui − 1/αi. Then γi ≥ 0. We show that the
KKT conditions hold. For any j, we have pj/uij ≥ 1/αi = Mi/ui − γi. If xij > 0, then
pj/uij = 1/αi = Mi/ui − γi. Prices are non-negative by definition and pj > 0 implies
that good j is completely allocated by Walras’s law. Finally, assume γi > 0. Then
Mi/ui(x) > 1/αi and hence
Mi >
ui(x)
αi
=
∑
j uijxij
αi
=
∑
j
pjxij ,
where the first equality follows from the fact that the allocation is modest. Let δ =
Mi/
∑
j pjxij . Then buyer i could afford the bundle δxi. Since xi is a demand bundle for
buyer i, we must have ci ≤
∑
j uijxij . Since the allocation is modest, we have equality. J
While utilities are unique, allocation and prices of modest MBB equilibria might not be unique.
Consider a market with two identical buyers and two goods, where u11 = u12 = u21 = u22 = 1,
c1 = c2 = 1, and M1 = M2 = 5. The unique equilibrium utility of both buyers is u1 = u2 = 1,
which can be obtained for any p1 = p2 = p, where p ∈ [0, 5] and allocation x satisfying
x11 + x12 = 1; x21 + x22 = 1; x11 + x21 = 1; x12 + x22 = 1.
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I Example 1 (continued). For our example above, the modest MBB equilibrium obtained
from solving the convex program is x11 = 1/5, x12 = 0, x21 = 4/5 and x22 = 1 with prices
p1 = 10/13 and p2 = 5/13. Buyer 1 spends 2/13, buyer 2 spends the entire budget. The
utilities are 1 and 13/5. It is easy to see that the KKT conditions hold. This equilibrium is
Pareto-optimal and also the best equilibrium in terms of social welfare. 
Structure of Modest MBB Equilibria. Let us characterize the set of price vectors of
modest MBB equilibria, which we denote by P = {p | (x,p) is modest MBB equilibrium }.
We consider the coordinate-wise comparison, i.e., p ≥ p′ iff pj ≥ p′j for all j ∈ G.
I Theorem 1. The pair (P,≥) is a lattice.
Given p and p′, we partition the set of goods into three sets: S0 = {j | pj = p′j}, S1 = {j |
pj < p
′
j} and S2 = {j | pj > p′j}. Let Γ(T,p) = {i | xij > 0 for some j ∈ T} denote the set
of buyers who are allocated a nonzero amount of any good in set T in the equilibrium (x,p).
The proof exploits the following properties about the sets S0, S1 and S2.
I Lemma 2. Given any two modest MBB equilibria (x,p) and (x′,p′), we have
(i) Γ(Si,p) = Γ(Si,p′) for i = 0, 1, 2, i.e., the set of buyers who buy the goods of Si with
respect to prices p and p′are same.
(ii) Γ(S0,p),Γ(S1,p) and Γ(S2,p) are mutually disjoint.
(iii) All buyers in Γ(S1,p) and Γ(S2,p) are capped buyers in both (x,p) and (x′,p′).
Proof. We first focus on S1, the set of goods whose prices strictly increase from p to p′.
For any i ∈ Γ(S1,p′), there is some j ∈ S1 such that uij/p′j ≥ ui`/p′` for all ` 6∈ S1. Since
uij/pj > uij/p
′
j and ui`/p′` ≥ uij/p` we conclude
(a) Γ(S1,p′) ⊆ Γ(S1,p), and
(b) xij = 0 for i ∈ Γ(S1,p′) and j /∈ S1.
Next we analyze the total money spent on goods in set S1 from buyers in Γ(S1,p′), with
respect to equilibria E = (x,p) and E′ = (x′,p′). Due to fact (b), buyers in Γ(S1,p′) will
only buy goods in the set S1 in E. We have∑
i∈Γ(S1,p′)
Mai =
∑
i∈Γ(S1,p′)
∑
j∈S1
xijpj ≤
∑
j∈S1
pj , (2)
where Mai is the money spent by buyer i ∈ Γ(S1,p′) in E. If i is uncapped in E, he remains
uncapped in E′ and his spending remains the same. For the other case, if i is capped in E,
he spends
∑
j∈S1 xijpj , and his spending in E
′ will be no more than
∑
j∈S1 xijp
′
j . Hence,
the total increase of spending of buyers in Γ(S1,p′) from p to p′ will be no more than∑
i∈Γ(S1,p′)
Mai
′ −
∑
i∈Γ(S1,p′)
Mai =
∑
i∈Γ(S1,p′)
∑
j∈S1
(xijp′j − xijpj) ≤
∑
j∈S1
p′j −
∑
j∈S1
pj , (3)
where Mai ′ is the money spent by buyer i ∈ Γ(S1,p′) in E′. Further, due to the definition of
Γ(S1,p′) and the fact that (x′,p′) is a market equilibrium, we have∑
j∈S1
p′j ≤
∑
i∈Γ(S1,p′)
Mai
′ . (4)
Summing up equations (2), (3) and (4) implies that they can hold at the same time if and
only if the three inequalities in them are all equalities. In (2) this implies there is no buyer
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outside Γ(S1,p′) that has nonzero allocation of any good in S1 in equilibrium E. Hence we
have Γ(S1,p) = Γ(S1,p′). In equation (3) this implies all buyers in Γ(S1,p′) are capped
buyers with both p and p′. In (4) this implies there is no buyer in Γ(S1,p′) that has nonzero
allocation of any good outside S1 in equilibrium (x′,p′). Hence Γ(S1,p′) does not have any
overlap with Γ(S0,p′) ∪ Γ(S2,p′).
Reversing the role of (x,p) and (x′,p′) and using the same argument, we can prove
the same claims for set S2. That is, Γ(S2,p) = Γ(S2,p′), Γ(S2,p′) has no overlap with
Γ(S0,p′)∪Γ(S1,p′), and all buyers in Γ(S2,p′) are capped buyers in both equilibria. Further,
the claims for both S1 and S2 implies Γ(S0,p) = Γ(S0,p′) and Γ(S0,p) has no overlap with
Γ(S1,p) ∪ Γ(S2,p). Together they prove the lemma. J
Proof of Theorem 1. It suffices to show that for any two modest MBB equilibria (x,p) and
(x′,p′) the supremum p = p ∨ p′ and infimum p = p ∧ p′ are both in P.
We prove the claim for p. The claim for p can be proved very similarly, and we omit the
details. Consider the supremum p and a suitable allocation x given by
pj =

p′j if j ∈ S1
pj if j ∈ S2
pj(or p′j) if j ∈ S0
xij =

x′ij if j ∈ S1
xij if j ∈ S2
xij if j ∈ S0 .
We will show that (x,p) is a modest MBB equilibrium. Compare p to p, we only increase
the prices of goods in S1 from p to p′. Hence, the equality edges connecting to S2 and S0
remain the same when prices change from p to p. Therefore, with regard to price vector
p, xij for goods j ∈ S2 ∪ S0 will remain a feasible MBB allocation that clears all surpluses
of goods in S2 ∪ S0. Using a similar argument, one can show that x′ij for goods j ∈ S1 will
remain MBB and clear all surpluses of goods in S1. We conclude that (x,p) is indeed a
modest MBB equilibrium. J
I Corollary 3. There exists a modest MBB equilibrium with coordinate-wise highest (resp.
lowest) prices. It yields the maximum (resp. minimum) revenue for the seller among all
modest MBB equilibria.
I Example 2. Consider the following market with two buyers and two goods. Let u11 =
u12 = u22 = 1 and u21 = 0. Let M1 = M2 = 1 and c1 = 1. Then x11 = x22 = 1,
x12 = 0, p1 = p2 = 1 is a modest MBB equilibrium with maximum revenue. A modest MBB
equilibrium with minimum revenue has the same allocation and p1 = 0 and p2 = 1.
3 Computing a Modest MBB Equilibrium with Maximum Revenue
In this section, we describe an efficient algorithm to compute a modest MBB equilibrium.
In fact, we compute the one with coordinate-wise highest prices and maximum revenue
among all modest MBB equilibria. Define the active budget of buyer i at prices p as
Mai = min{Mi, ci/αi}, where αi = maxj∈G uij/pj is the MBB ratio. The active budget of
buyer i is the minimum of Mi and the minimum amount of money needed to buy a bundle
of goods with utility ci. If Mai = ci/αi then buyer i is capped, otherwise uncapped.
3.1 Flow Network and Initialization
Given prices p, let A = {(i, j) ⊆ B ×G | uij/pj = αi} be the set of equality edges, and the
bipartite graph (B ∪G,A) be the equality graph. We set up the following flow network Np
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using the equality graph by adding a source s and sink t. It has nodes {s, t} ∪B ∪G and
edges (s, i) for i ∈ B, (j, t) for j ∈ G and the equality edges. The edge (s, i) has capacity
Mai , and the edge (j, t) has capacity pj . The equality edges have infinite capacity. The flow
in the network corresponds to money. We will maintain the following invariants throughout
the algorithm.
Invariants:
The edges out of s are saturated.
Prices and active budgets never increase.
Total utility of a buyer never decreases. Once a buyer is capped, it stays capped.
We initialize the prices to large values, namely pj =
∑
iMi. Wlog we will assume that
all budgets, caps, and utilities are integers.
The surplus (residual capacity) of good j is rj = pj − fjt, where fjt is the flow from
good j to t. Then 1− fjt/pj is the fraction of good j that is not sold. We also keep track of
the allocations xij . There might be prices equal to zero and then the allocation cannot be
computed from the money flow. Goods that have price zero have no surplus. There is no
money flowing through them, although they may be (partially) allocated.
A subset T of buyers is called tight with respect to prices p if
∑
i∈T M
a
i =
∑
j∈Γ(T ) pj ,
where Γ(T ) ⊆ S is the set of goods connected to T in the equality graph.
A balanced flow is a maximum flow in Np which minimizes the 2-norm of surplus vector r.
Let |r| = |r1|+ . . .+ |rn| and ‖r‖ = (r21 + . . .+ r2n)1/2 be the `1 and `2 norm of r, respectively.
3.2 The Algorithm
The complete algorithm is shown in Figure 1. We initialize price pj of each good j to∑
iMi. This ensures that the invariants are satisfied, namely a maximum flow in network Np
saturates all edges out of s. We initialize every active budget Mai = min{Mi,minj cipj/uij},
and flow f and allocation x equal to zero.
The algorithm is divided into a set of phases, and each phase is further divided into a set
of iterations. A phase starts with the computation of a balanced flow in Np. Let the surplus
of good j be pj − fjt. We pick a good j with maximum surplus, and we compute a set of
goods S containing j and the goods which can reach j in the residual network corresponding
to Np without using nodes s and t. The surplus of each good in S is the same, and maximum
among all goods. We denote by B′ the set of buyers who have equality edges to goods in S,
and by B′c and B′u the sets of capped and uncapped buyers in B′, respectively. Note that
xij = 0 for all i ∈ B′ and j 6∈ S, since xij > 0 would imply j ∈ S.
We begin with an iteration, where we use a factor x to set the price of each good j ∈ S
to xpj and the active budget of each buyer i ∈ B′c to xMai . The prices and active budgets of
the remaining goods and buyers remain unchanged. We decrease x ≤ 1 continuously until
some structural change happens. Our goal here is to decrease prices as much as possible. By
changing prices in this manner, all the equality edges between B′ and S stay intact and the
equality edges between B′ and G \ S become non-equality.
A possible structural change is that an uncapped buyer becomes capped. When a buyer
i ∈ B′ is uncapped, Mi < minj cipj/uij . Prices are decreasing, so this may become an
equality. We term the first such change Event 1. Then we move buyer i from B′u to B′c.
Another possible change is that a new equality edge appears from a buyer in B \B′ to
a good in S. Prices of goods in S are decreasing, so goods in S are becoming attractive
to buyers outside B′. Note that there cannot be a new equality edge from a buyer in B′
to a good outside S. We term the first such change Event 2. Then we recompute the flow
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Input: A market with a set of buyers B and a set of goods G;
Budget Mi, happiness cap ci, and utility parameters uij , ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ G;
Output: Equilibrium prices p, allocation x;
n← |B|; m← |G|; U ← maxi∈B,j∈G{Mi, ci, uij}; ← 1/((m+ n)U4(m+n));
Initialize price pj ←
∑
iMi for each good j;
Initialize active budget Mai ← min{Mi,minj cipj/uij} for each buyer i;
fij ← 0, xij ← 0, ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ G;
Repeat // phase
f ← balanced flow in Np; xij ← fij/pj if pj 6= 0; rj ← pj − fjt;
δ ← maxj rj ; Pick a good j with surplus δ;
S ← {j} ∪ {k ∈ G | k can reach j in the residual network w.r.t. f in Np \ {s, t}};
Repeat // iteration
B′ ← Set of buyers who have incident equality edges to S;
B′c ← Set of capped buyers in B′ (a buyer i is capped if Mai = minj cipj/uij);
B′u ← B′ \B′c (set of uncapped buyers);
x← 1; Define prices and active budgets as follows:
pj ← xpj , ∀j ∈ S; Mai ← xMai , ∀i ∈ B′c;
Decrease x continuously down from 1 until one of the following events occurs
Event 1: An uncapped buyer becomes capped
Event 2: A new equality edge appears
Recompute Np;
f ← balanced flow in Np; xij ← fij/pj if pj 6= 0;
S ← S ∪ {j ∈ G | j can reach S in the residual network w.r.t. f in Np \ {s, t}};
Event 3: A subset of B′ becomes tight // phase ends
Until Event 3 occurs;
Until |r| ≤ ;
Recompute Np;
f ← balanced flow in Np; xij ← fij/pj if pj 6= 0;
Figure 1 The complete algorithm
network Np and a balanced flow in Np. Next, we compute the set S′ of goods j ∈ G \ S that
can reach a good in S in the residual graph corresponding to Np without using the nodes s
and t. Due to the property of balanced flows, the surplus of each good in S′ is at least the
surplus of some good in S. Finally, we add goods in S′ to S.
Apart from the structural changes, we also maintain the invariants. The only invariant
that can become violated with these changes is that the edges out of s are saturated. Hence,
we need to stop when a subset T of B′ becomes tight. Clearly, if prices are decreased further,
then buyers in T will not be saturated, so we stop decreasing prices at this stage. We term
this Event 3, and then the phase ends. We show in Lemma 8 below that during a phase, the
2-norm of the surplus vector decreases geometrically. The last phase ends when the total
surplus becomes tiny. In fact, we will show that the surplus is actually zero at this point.
We recompute a balanced flow and terminate.
When the prices of a set of goods hit zero in an iteration of the algorithm, then we do
not change the allocation of these goods, and all the buyers interested in these goods must
be capped. Since each buyer gets a modest allocation before the prices hit zero, the same
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allocation remains modest. None of the goods in the set is completely allocated. We delete
these goods and the buyers to which they are allocated from consideration.
I Example 1 (continued). Consider our algorithm applied to the example market above. We
initialize p1 and p2 to M1 +M2 = 4. The active budgets become Ma1 = minj c1pj/uij = 4/5
andMa2 = 1. The edges (1, 1) and (2, 1) are equality edges and the balanced flow is f11 = 4/5,
f21 = 1, and f12 = f22 = 0. The surpluses are r1 = 4 − 9/5 = 11/5 and r2 = 4 − 0 = 4.
Thus S = {2}. We decrease p2 to xp2. At x = 1/2, the edge (2, 2) becomes an equality edge.
Now p2 = 2. The balanced flow does not change and hence r1 = 11/5 and r2 = 2. Thus
S = {1}. We decrease Ma1 to 4x/5 and p1 to 4x. At x = 5/16, B′ becomes tight. We now
have Ma1 = 1/4 and p1 = 5/4. The balanced flow is f11 = 1/4 and f21 = 1. Thus r1 = 0 and
r2 = 2. So S = {2}. We change p2 to p2x. At x = 5/16, the edge (2, 2) becomes an equality
edge. Now p2 = 5/8. The balanced flow is f11 = 1/4, f21 = 11/16, and f22 = 5/16. Then
r1 = r2 = 5/16. Thus S = {1, 2}. We now decrease Ma1 to x · 1/4, p1 to 5x/4 and p2 to 5x/8.
At x = 8/13, B′ becomes tight and we have p1 = 10/13, p2 = 5/13, Ma1 = 2/13, x11 = 1/5,
x21 = 4/5, x22 = 1, f11 = 2/13, f21 = 8/13, and f22 = 5/13. 
3.3 Analysis
I Lemma 4. The invariants hold during the run of the algorithm.
Proof. Clearly, prices are non-increasing. As a result, the active budgets of buyers are also
non-increasing. The tight-set event makes sure that buyers are always saturated. As a result,
the total utility of each buyer never decreases, since he spends his entire active budget and
prices are non-increasing. J
Phases consist of iterations, which end with Event 1, 2, or 3. A phase ends with Event 3.
I Lemma 5. Each phase has at most 2n iterations.
Proof. Each iteration ends with one of the three events. In case of Event 1, an uncapped
buyer becomes capped, and there can be at most n iterations of this kind (Lemma 4). In
case of Event 2, a new equality edge arises from a buyer outside B′ to a good in S. This adds
at least one new buyer to B′. Further prices are changed in a way so that no buyer leaves B′,
hence the number of such events are again at most n. In case of Event 3, the phase ends. J
Our next goal is to show that the 2-norm of the surplus vector decreases substantially
during a phase. Let r and r′ be the surplus vectors at the beginning and at the end of a
phase respectively. For the purpose of our analysis we also maintain an intermediate flow
f continuously as we change prices in each iteration; this flow is not maintained by the
algorithm. When we recompute a balanced flow during Event 2, then f will be reset to the
balanced flow. It is defined as ∀i ∈ B′c : fij ← xfij and ∀i ∈ B′u : fij ← fij . f ensures that
all buyers are saturated. If the surplus of a good j becomes zero corresponding to f , then we
keep its surplus equal to zero and reroute extra flow from j to some other good with positive
surplus, using a path in the residual network corresponding to f . If there is no such path,
then this implies Event 3 has occurred, in which case the current phase is done. Consider an
intermediate iteration t. With respect to f , let rt = (rt1, . . . , rtm) be the surplus vector at the
beginning of iteration t, and let r˜t = (r˜t1, . . . , r˜tm) be the surplus vector before we recompute
a balanced flow in iteration t if Event 2 occurs.
I Lemma 6. r˜tj ≤ rtj , ∀j ∈ G, and ‖rt+1‖ ≤ ‖r˜t‖ ≤ ‖rt‖.
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Proof. For the first part, let pt and f t respectively denote prices and flows at the beginning
of iteration t. Note that both prices and flows are unchanged for goods outside S, hence
r˜tj = rtj ,∀j 6∈ S. For goods in S we have rtj = ptj −
∑
i∈B′c f
t
ij −
∑
i∈B′u f
t
ij and r˜tj =
xptj − x
∑
i∈B′c f
t
ij −
∑
i∈B′u f
t
ij for an x ≤ 1, which implies that r˜tj ≤ rtj , ∀j ∈ S before
surplus of some good becomes zero. Further, when the surplus of a good j becomes zero, we
reroute extra flow from j to some other good k. This will further decrease the surplus of k.
This proves the first part.
Due to the first part, we have ‖r˜t‖ ≤ ‖rt‖. For the first inequality of the second part,
note that rt+1 is different from r˜t only due to recomputation of the balanced flow. The flow
at r˜t is feasible, and the balanced flow can only make the norm better than the norm at r˜t.
The second part follows. J
I Lemma 7. [17] Suppose f and f∗ are a feasible and a balanced flow in Np, resp., and
r and r∗ are the surplus vectors w.r.t. f and f∗, resp. If r∗j = rj − δ for some good j and
δ > 0, then ‖r∗‖2 ≤ ‖r‖2 − δ2.
I Lemma 8. ‖r′‖2 ≤ (1− 1/4mn)‖r‖2.
Proof. Consider the value of γ = min{rj | j ∈ S} during a phase. When the phase begins,
γ = δ, and when it ends γ = 0. Recall that S only grows, and when we add a new good k to
S, then the surplus of k is at least the surplus of some good already in S. This implies that
γ does not change when we add new goods to S.
Let t1, . . . , tl be the iterations where γ decreases, and let δi > 0 be the amount of decrease
in iteration ti. Further we break each δi into two parts δi1 and δi2 such that δi = δi1 + δi2.
Here δi1 is the amount of decrease due to the flow change before we recompute balanced flow,
and δi2 is the amount of decrease due to recomputation of balanced flow. Next consider only
positive δi1’s and δi2’s. Clearly, l ≤ 2n and
∑
i:δi1>0,δi2>0(δi1 + δi2) ≥ δ. Using Lemmas 6
and 7, we have ‖r′‖2 ≤ ‖r‖2− (δ211 + δ212 + · · ·+ δ2l1 + δ2l2) ≤ ‖r‖2− δ2/4n. Since ‖r‖2 ≤ mδ2,
we have ‖r′‖2 ≤ (1− 1/4mn)‖r‖2. J
Polynomial Running Time. In each iteration, the prices of goods in S are multiplied
by a value that itself depends on the prices. It is not obvious why the size of the numbers
in the computation is polynomially bounded. Here we show that the sizes of intermediate
prices and flows in our algorithm remain polynomially bounded.
I Lemma 9. All goods in S are connected by equality edges at all times. There is no flow
from buyers in B′ to goods outside S.
Proof. In each phase, S is initialized to all goods that can reach the selected good of highest
surplus in the residual graph. The set B′ is always the set of buyers that have equality edges
to S. The prices of the goods in S are changed by the same factor and hence no equality
edges in B′ × S is destroyed. When a good is added to S, it has a path to S in the residual
graph and hence is connected to S via equality edges.
Buyers in B′ are connected to goods in S by equality edges. Assume there would be a
flow from a buyer in B′ to a good g outside S. Then there would be a path from g to S in
the residual graph and hence g would belong to S. J
Cap-events occur only at a cap-event prices. A cap-event price is any price p withMi = cip/uij
for some i and j. Let Pc = {Miuij/ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}.
Let A′ be any subset of the edge set with positive utility such that the graph formed by
it is connected. Let B′ and G′ be the buyers and goods in this connected graph. The prices
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in the component have only one degree of freedom, i.e., we can select one of the prices, say p,
as a base price and express any other price in the component as αp, where α is a rational
whose numerator and denominator are products of at most m utilities. Consider an arbitrary
partition of B′ into capped buyers B′c and uncapped buyers B′u; B′u must be nonempty. The
budget of a capped buyer is of the form cαp, where c is a cap and α is as above. If there are
no surpluses, p must satisfy that (budget of capped buyers + budget of uncapped buyers)
equals sum of the prices (in the component). We call a price that can be obtained in this
way a submarket price; note that not all submarket prices can actually occur. Let Pm be the
set of submarket prices.
Let Pi be the set consisting of the initial price and zero. A price is 1-linked if it is of the
form (U1/U2)p where p ∈ Pc ∪ Pm ∪ Pi and U1 and U2 are products of at most n utilities
each. A price is 2-linked if it of the form (U1/U2)p, where p is 1-linked and U1 and U2 are
products of at most n utilities each.
I Lemma 10. Assuming that all budgets, happiness caps and utilities are integers bounded by
U , 1-linked and 2-linked prices are rational numbers whose bit-length is at most log (m+ n) +
3(m+ n) logU .
Proof. The prices in sets Pi and Pc are clearly rational numbers with bit length at most
n lognU . For the set Pm, we have the following linear equation in p∑
j
αjp−
∑
i
ciαip =
∑
i
Mi,
where both αj ’s and αi’s are rational numbers whose numerator and denominator are product
of at most m utilities. By simplifying the above equation, we obtain that p is a rational
number whose both numerator and denominator are at most (m+ n)Um+n. This implies
that the 1-linked and 2-linked prices are rational numbers whose bit lengths are at most
log (m+ n) + 3(m+ n) logU . J
I Lemma 11. At the beginning of a phase, all prices are 1-linked. During a phase, prices
outside S are 1-linked. At the end of each iteration, prices in S are 2-linked.
Proof. At the beginning of the first phase, all prices are equal to the initial price and hence
1-linked. Consider any later phase. Prices of goods outside S are the same as at the beginning
of the phase and hence are 1-linked by induction hypothesis. Consider next the prices of
the goods in S. The phase ended because some set T ⊆ B′ became tight. If T contains an
uncapped buyer, the new prices of the goods in Γ(T ) are submarket prices, where Γ(T ) is
the set of goods connected to T in the equality graph. Since all goods in S are connected to
a good in Γ(T ) by equality edges, all prices in S are 1-linked. If T contains only uncapped
buyers and the tight set event co-occurred with a capping event, one of the prices in S will
be a cap-event price and hence all other prices in S are 1-linked. The final possibility is that
all prices in S are zero. Then they are also 1-linked. This proves that in the beginning all
prices are 1-linked.
Now, during a phase prices outside S do not change and hence are 1-linked. A tight-set
event ends a phase and after the recomputation of the prices, all prices are 1-linked as shown
above. When a capping event occurs, some price of a good in S becomes a cap-event price
and hence all prices in S are 1-linked. After a new edge event, all goods in S are connected
to some good previously outside S by equality edges. Since the price of the good outside S
is 1-linked, the prices in S will be 2-linked. J
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I Remark. Why are we not simply stating that all prices are connected to a price in
Pc ∪ Pm ∪ Pi by a sequence of equality edges? During the course of the algorithm, we are
loosing equality edges, namely edges connecting buyers in B′ to goods outside S. Since these
edges do no carry flow, this does no harm. However, some of these edges may have played
a role in expressing a price in terms of a reference price. Thus we cannot say that current
prices are linked to reference prices through current equality edges. We can only say that
current prices are linked to reference prices through a path of edges of nonzero utility. We
do not know whether these paths stay simple. Lemma 11 shows that the paths are at most
2n in length.
I Theorem 12. The algorithm in Figure 1 computes a modest MBB equilibrium.
Proof. When the algorithm terminates, we claim that at this stage total surplus
∑
j rj = 0.
This will imply that the algorithm in Figure 1 computes a market equilibrium. Consider any
good j and the component C of the equality graph containing good j. The total surplus∑
j∈C rj in the component is
∑
j∈C pj −
∑
i∈CM
a
i . This is non-negative and less than . All
prices and active budgets of capped buyers can be expressed in terms of one price variable p
using equality relations. By Lemma 10, p is a rational number with bounded denominator,
and the above inequalities imply
∑
j∈C rj = 0. Thus rj = 0 for all j. J
Let xts denote the value of x when Event 3 occurs in the algorithm. Next we show that
xts can be computed using at most n max-flow computations. This is a generalization of a
procedure in [17] for computing tight set in case of linear Fisher markets.
I Lemma 13. xts can be computed using at most n max-flow computation.
Proof. Let C be the connected component of the equality graph containing the goods S,
and consider buyers B′ as defined in Figure 1. Let P be the total price of the goods in S
(when x = 1). The active budget of the buyers in B′ is U + xV . B′ is not tight at x = 1. It
goes tight at x determined by U + xV = Px, i.e., x = U/(P − V ). Let us set the prices of
the goods in S to xp, where p is the price vector. Also set the active budgets as determined
by x. Compute a max-flow.
If all of the budget can be routed, then B′ is the smallest tight set. Otherwise, let
(s∪B1 ∪G1, B2 ∪G2 ∪ t) be the minimum cut. At the price vector xp, the buyers in B2 can
still get rid of their entire budget. Hence the tightest set is contained in B1. We recurse on
s ∪B1 ∪G1 ∪ t. This clearly requires at most n max flow computations. J
I Remark. Whenever C is enlarged, the tightest set must be recomputed. The critical x may
decrease. It cannot increase as the buyers in the old C are not acquiring new equality edges.
Maximum Revenue. Finally, we show that our algorithm gives a modest MBB equilibrium
with maximum revenue among all modest MBB equilibria.
I Lemma 14. Consider the price vector p at the end of any phase of the algorithm. We
have p ≥ p′ for any price vector p′ ∈ P of a modest MBB equilibrium.
Proof. Let T be the set of goods whose price strictly increases from p to p′. We will prove
T = ∅ in two steps:
Step 1. First we show that for any good j with rj > 0, we have j /∈ T . Suppose by
contradiction that this is not true. Let f, x and r be the balanced flow, allocation and surplus
vector with respect to prices p, respectively. Let Γ(T,p) and Γ(T,p′) be the set of buyers
connected to T in the equality graph with regard to p and p′, respectively.
We observe two facts:
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(1) Γ(T,p′) ⊆ Γ(T,p).
(2) xij = 0 for i ∈ Γ(T,p′) and j /∈ T .
Now we analyze the total money spent on goods in set T from buyers in Γ(T,p′), with
respect to prices p and p′ respectively.
Because r is a non-negative vector with at least one positive entry in T , we have∑
i∈Γ(T,p′)
Mai =
∑
i∈Γ(T,p′)
∑
j∈T
xijpj <
∑
j∈T
pj . (5)
For every i ∈ Γ(T,p′), if i is uncapped with p, he remains uncapped with p′, and his
active budget will remain unchanged. If i is capped with p, his active budget with prices p
is
∑
j∈T xijpj , and his new active budget with prices p′ will be no more than
∑
j∈T xijp
′
j .
Hence the total increase of all active budgets for buyers in Γ(T,p′) from p to p′ will be no
more than∑
i∈Γ(T,p′)
∑
j∈T
(xijp′j − xijpj) ≤
∑
j∈T
p′j −
∑
j∈T
pj (6)
Combine inequality (6) with (5) indicates that the total active budgets of buyers in
Γ(T,p′) is strictly less than
∑
j∈T p
′
j , and it is not enough to clear all the surpluses of goods
in T . This contradicts the fact that p′ is an equilibrium.
Step 2. Next we show for any good j with rj = 0, j cannot be in T either. Let k be the
last phase at the end of which has rj > 0. Notice that in phase k + 1, we decrease the price
of good j continuously, and the first moment when rj reaches zero marks the end of this
phase. Thus at the end of phase k + 1, we will also have pj ≥ p′j . In the remaining steps of
the algorithm the price of good j is never touched again. This means pj ≥ p′j will always
hold. J
For the main result in this section, assume that all budgets, happiness caps and utilities are
integers bounded by U .
I Theorem 15. The algorithm in Figure 1 computes a modest MBB equilibrium with
maximum revenue in O(mn6(log(m+ n) + (m+ n) logU)) time.
Proof. In the beginning, the 2-norm of surplus vector r satisfies ‖r‖2 ≤ mn2U2. By
Theorem 12, the algorithm will terminate before the norm becomes ‖r′‖2 = 1/m(m +
n)2U8(m+n). Let k denote the number of phases when the surplus becomes r′. From
Lemma 8, we have ‖r‖2(1− 1/4mn)k = ‖r′‖2, which implies that the total number of phases
in the algorithm is O(mn(log(m+ n) + (m+ n) logU)).
In each phase, we have at most 2n iterations, and in each iteration we need to compute
the maximum 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 when one of the three events occurs. Let xc, xeq and xts respectively
denote the maximum value of x where Event 1, 2 and 3 occurs. Clearly, xc can be obtained
in O(n) time, xeq can be obtained in O(mn) time, and xts can be obtained using at most n
max-flow computations due to Lemma 13. Further, we recompute a balanced flow in case of
Event 2 which further requires at most n max-flow computations [17]. Since a max-flow can
be obtained in O(n3) time, each iteration can be implemented in O(n4) time. Hence, the
total running time of the algorithm is O(mn6(log(m+ n) + (m+ n) logU)). J
We conjecture that the running time in Theorem 15 can be reduced by a factor of O˜(n2)
using the perturbation technique from [19] which requires a max-flow to be computed only
in a network with forest structure. We have not worked out the details.
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Input: A market with a set of buyers B and a set of goods G;
Budget Mi, happiness cap ci, and utility parameters uij , ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ G;
Any modest MBB equilibrium (x,p);
Output: A modest MBB equilibrium (x,p) with minimum revenue;
Initialize active budget M ′i ← min{Mi,minj cipj/uij} for each buyer i;
S ← {j|pj > 0 and j does not have incident equality edges to any uncapped buyer};
While S 6= ∅
B′ ← Set of buyers who have incident equality edges to S;
x← 1; Define prices and active budgets as follows:
pj ← xpj , ∀j ∈ S; Mai ← xMai , ∀i ∈ B′c;
Decrease x continuously down from 1 until one of the following events occurs
Event 1: x becomes zero;
Event 2: A new equality edge appears
Recompute Np and S;
EndWhile
Figure 2 The postprocessing algorithm for an equilibrium with minimum revenue
4 Computing a Modest MBB Equilibrium with Minimum Revenue
In this section, we show how to transform in polynomial time any modest MBB equilibrium
into one with minimum revenue using the postprocessing procedure in Fig. 2.
I Theorem 16. The algorithm in Figure 2 computes a modest MBB equilibrium with
minimum revenue.
Proof. It is easy to check that throughout the algorithm, (x,p) always remains a modest
MBB equilibrium. Assume by contradiction that at the end of the algorithm, (x,p) is not
an equilibrium with smallest prices. Let (x′,p′) be an equilibrium with smallest prices, and
define S1 = {j | pj > p′j}. By Lemma 2 property (3), all buyers in Γ(S1,p) are capped
buyers. Because prices of goods in set S1 decreases from p to p′, every buyer i incident
to S1 in the equality graph with prices p will only have equality edges to S1 with prices
p′. Therefore we have i ∈ Γ(S1,p′) = Γ(S1,p) (the equality is again by Lemma 2). This
implies Γ(S1,p) is also the set of buyers who have incident equality edges to S1 with prices
p. Hence, set S is nonempty for the While loop and the algorithm should not terminate. J
5 Extensions
In the previous section, we proposed an algorithm for computing a modest MBB equilibrium,
which has a Pareto-optimal allocation. When we depart from the set of such equilibria, then
utilities in market equilibrium are not uniquely determined. In fact, we show that market
equilibria with maximum social welfare might not be modest MBB equilibria, and computing
such optimal equilibria becomes NP-hard.
I Theorem 17. It is NP-hard to compute a market equilibrium that maximizes social welfare.
Proof. We reduce from 3-Dimensional Matching. Consider an instance I composed
of three disjoint sets A, B, C of elements and a set T ⊆ A × B × C of triples. Let
n = |A| = |B| = |C| be the number of elements in each set and m = |T | the number of
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triples. W.l.o.g. assume m ≥ n. Now we construct a Fisher market based on I as follows. For
each element i ∈ A ∪B ∪ C we introduce an element agent i with budget 1. For each triple
j ∈ T we introduce a good j and an auxiliary agent ij with budget 1. All these agents have
linear utility functions. In addition, there is a single decision agent id with a budget-additive
utility function and a budget of 4m2(m− n).
For the utility values, for each agent i ∈ A ∪B ∪C we assume uij = 1 if triple j contains
i and 0 otherwise. For auxiliary agent ij the utility is uijj = 1/m3 and 0 for all other
goods. Finally, the decision agent id has utility uidj = 1/m3 for every good j and a cap of
cid = (m− n)/(m(m2 + 1)). Our claim is that a market equilibrium with social welfare of
W = 3n · (1/4) + n · (1/4m3) + (m− n)/m3 exists if and only if the instance I has a solution.
First, suppose I has a solution S ⊆ T . Then we set the prices to be pj = 4 for every
j ∈ S and pj = m2 + 1 for every j 6∈ S. As for the allocation, each agent i spends its entire
budget of 1 on the good j ∈ S that includes him. Each auxiliary agent spends its budget on
the corresponding good. Finally, the decision agent id spends a budget of m2 on each of the
m− n goods j 6∈ S. Observe that all goods are allocated, and (since w.l.o.g. we can assume
m > 2) every agent with linear utility function spends its entire budget on an MBB good.
The decision agent has optimal utility (m− n) · (1/m3) ·m2/(m2 + 1) = cid . As such, we
obtain a market equilibrium. Straightforward inspection reveals that the social welfare in
this state is indeed W .
On the other hand, assume that a market equilibrium achieves a social welfare of at least
W . Note that for each good j, the auxiliary agent can at most obtain a utility of 1/m3
by getting all of good j. Similarly, the decision agent can obtain at most m goods and get
a utility of cid for all of them. Thus, by giving all goods to auxiliary and decision agents,
together they can contribute at most 1/m2 to the social welfare.
We first observe that in every market equilibrium the decision agent obtains a utility of
cid . Consider any good j and let us broadly overestimate the price in equilibrium by assuming
that the auxiliary agent and all three element agents spend a total budget of 4 on j. This is
clearly an upper bound on the money that is spent by the element and auxiliary agents on
good j. To derive an upper bound, assume this happens on every good j. Even in this case,
the decision agent can contribute a budget of 4m2 to any set of m − n goods. Since in a
market equilibrium, the goods must be shared in proportion to the money spent, the decision
agent would thereby be able to obtain a share of 4m2/(4m2 + 4) = m2/(m2 + 1) from each
good it contributes to. In total this yields a utility of (m− n) · (m2/(m2 + 1)) · (1/m3) = cid .
Hence, in every market equilibrium the decision agent obtains at least a total share of
(m− n) ·m2/(m2 + 1) of all the goods. Thus, the total remaining supply of goods that can
be allocated to the remaining agents is at most n+ (m− n)/(m2 + 1).
Let us now discuss how to distribute this remaining supply optimally among the agents.
For every good j, any equilibrium allocation must be proportional to the incoming money.
We remove the fraction obtained by the decision agent, denote the remaining supply by sj ,
and note sj ≥ 0 and
∑
j sj ≤ n+ (m− n)/(m2 + 1). The auxiliary agent always spends its
budget of 1 on j. Let yj be the money spent by element agents on good j, so 3 ≥ yj ≥ 0
and
∑
j yj = 3n. The welfare obtained from good j by auxiliary and element agents in any
equilibrium is
sj
(
yj
yj + 1
+ 1
yj + 1
· 14m3
)
.
Hence, the social welfare obtained by element and auxiliary agents in any market equilibrium
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is upper bounded by the optimum solution to the following optimization problem:
Max.
∑
j∈[m]
sj
yj + 1/(4m3)
yj + 1
s.t.
∑
j∈[m]
sj = n+ m−nm2+1∑
j∈[m]
yj = 3n
yj ≤ 3 ∀j ∈ [m]
sj ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ [m]
(7)
The objective function is linear in the sj and convace in the yj , the constraints are concave,
the equality constraints are affine and their gradients are linearly independent. The feasible
solution yj = 3/m and sj = (n+ (m− n)/(m2 + 1))/m satisfies the inequality constraints
with strict inequality. Hence, the KKT-conditions characterize the unique optimal solution.
We use dual variables α and β for the equality constraints, λj and µj for the inequality
constraints. The optimal solution must satisfy
−yj + 1/(4m
3)
yj + 1
+ α+ µj = 0
−sj 1− 1/(4m
3)
(yj + 1)2
+ β + λj = 0
λj(yj − 3) = 0 and λj ≥ 0 for all j
µj(sj − 1) = 0 and µj ≥ 0 for all j
Thus, α ≤ (yj + 1/(4m3))/(yj + 1) for all j. Note that α < (yj + 1/(4m3))(yj + 1) implies
µj > 0 and sj = 1. Also βj ≤ sj(1 − 1/(4m3))/(yj + 1)2 for all j. Similarly, βj <
sj(1 − 1/(4m3))/(yj + 1)2 implies λj > 0 and yj = 3. We number the y’s such that
y1 ≥ y2 ≥ . . . ≥ ym. Let ` be such that y1 ≥ . . . ≥ y` > y`+1 = . . . = ym. Then sj = 1 for
1 ≤ j ≤ ` and hence ` ≤ n. Let k ≤ ` be such that y1 = . . . = yk > yk+1. Then yj = 3 for
1 ≤ j ≤ k. If k < `, yk+2 > 0 since
∑
j yj = 3n, and we increase the objective by increasing
yk+1. Thus k = `. If ` < n, s`+2 > 0 and we increase the objective by increasing s`+1 and
y`+1. Thus ` = n, and the unique optimum is y1 = . . . = yn = 3, yn+1 = . . . = ym = 0,
s1 = . . . = sn = 1.
This proves that in the optimum there are n goods to which the decision player does not
contribute (sj = 1) and for which there are exactly three element players that can contribute
all their budget to this good (yj = 3). Thus, the upper bound on the social welfare is attained
only when the decision player contributes to exactly m− n goods such that the remaining n
goods correspond to a partition of the 3n agents into n disjoint triples. By straightforward
inspection, we see that the upper bound on the social welfare amounts to exactly W . A
market equilibrium of social welfare W can exist only if there is a solution to the underlying
instance I. This concludes the proof. J
As a corollary, we note that the proof can also be used to show NP-hardness for optimizing
any constant norm of utility values.
I Corollary 18. It is NP-hard to compute a market equilibrium (x,p) that maximizes∑
i(ui(x))ρ, for every constant ρ > 0.
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Proof. For ρ > 1, we can use exactly the same reduction. The optimum coincides with the
optimum for social welfare, since we still want to maximize the share of goods assigned to the
element agents. For constant 0 < ρ < 1 and sufficiently large m, the common factor 1/(4m3)
is strong enough to keep the incentive of maximizing the share of the element agents. J
There are several ways of introducing satiation points into the utility function. Instead of a
global cap, let us assume there is a cap cij for the utility buyer i can obtain from good j.
A good-based budget-additive utility of buyer i is then ui(xi) =
∑
j min(cij , uijxij). This
variant turns out to be an elementary special case of separable piecewise-linear concave
(SPLC) utilities, in which every piece consists of a linear segment followed by a constant
segment. We show that even finding a single market equilibrium here becomes PPAD-hard.
I Theorem 19. It is PPAD-hard to compute a market equilibrium in Fisher markets with
good-based budget-additive utilities.
Proof. We adapt the construction of Chen and Teng [9] to prove the theorem. They show
PPAD-completeness of computing an approximate equilibrium in Fisher markets under SPLC
utilities where each PLC function has at most two segments. Here, the second segment can
have positive rate of utility, i.e., non-zero slope, hence PPAD-hardness for Fisher markets
under good-based budget-additive utilities where the second segment has zero slope, i.e., no
utility, requires adjustment in their construction.
Chen and Teng [9] reduce the PPAD-hard problem of computing an approximate Nash
equilibrium in a two-player game to the problem of computing an approximate equilibrium
in Fisher markets under SPLC utilities. Their main idea is to construct a family of price-
regulating marketsMn for each n ≥ 1, which has n buyers and 2n goods. InMn, each buyer
has budget of 3 units and each good has supply of 1 unit, and every approximate equilibrium
price vector p satisfies the following price-regulation property:
1
2 ≤
p2k−1
p2k
≤ 2 and p2k−1 + p2k ≈ 3 for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n. (8)
Next for a given two-player game, additional buyers are inserted in the price-regulating
market and game parameters are embedded into their budget and utility functions. These
new buyers are given very small budget so that the price-regulation property is still satisfied.
First, we modify the family of price-regulating marketsMn for each n ≥ 1 so that each
PLC function is either linear or linear with a threshold. In the construction of [9], each buyer
k derives non-zero utility only from goods 2k − 1 and 2k. Its utility function for good 2k − 1
is linear with slope 2 (utility per unit amount), and for good 2k it is linear with slope 4 till
unit amount and then linear with slope 1. Since the slope of the second segment is 1, it is
not good-based budget-additive utility function. Simply decreasing the slope of the second
segment from 1 to 0 does not work. We get only one inequality:
1
2 ≤
p2k−1
p2k
.
To construct a correct reduction, we use two buyers, say (k, 1) and (k, 2), instead of one
buyer k. We set the supply of each good to 2 units instead of 1. Both buyers (k, 1) and
(k, 2) have budget of 3 units each, and both derive non-zero utility only from goods 2k − 1
and 2k. We set the utility function of buyer (k, 1) as follows: For good 2k − 1, it is linear
with slope 2, and for good 2k, it is linear with slope 4 till unit amount and then linear with
zero slope. Similarly, the utility function of buyer (k, 2) is set as follows: For good 2k, it is
linear with slope 2, and for good 2k − 1, it is linear with slope 4 till unit amount and then
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linear with zero slope. We claim that this enforces the price-regulation property (8) on every
equilibrium price vector p.
Suppose p2k−1/p2k > 2 then buyer (k, 2) demands only good 2k. This results in more
demand of good 2k and less demand of good 2k − 1, hence does not give an equilibrium.
Similarly, we get contradiction for the case p2k−1/p2k < 1/2. When 12 ≤ p2k−1p2k ≤ 2, then
buyer (k, 1) demands one unit of good 2k − 1 and one unit of good 2k, and the same for
buyer 2k. This yields an equilibrium.
Next, for the additional buyers who embed the game parameters, we simply change the
slope of the second segment from positive to zero for each utility function. We claim that
this works because these buyers do not buy any good on the second segment in the original
construction of [9]. Hence, it has no effect on equilibrium when the slope of the second
segment is decreased. This concludes the proof. J
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